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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REJrERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY TEPAT ENTICING A CMILD UNDER 16 TO ENTER A 
7'EEZCLE MUST BE DONE U'ITH THE INTENT THAT THE CEBILD SHALL BE 
CONCEALED FROM PUBLIC J~IEW 
A. Intent to Conceal a Child Under 16 From Public View is an Element of I.C.518- 
In State v. Sindak, 116 Idaho 185, 774 P.2d 895 (1989) tile supreme court states that 
since "the Court of Appeals found that Sindak's right to a speedy trial had been violated, such 
issue was deemed dispositive, and the Court of Appeals did not rule on the remaining issues 
raised by Sindak." Sindak. 116 Idaho 897. The supreme court notes that these issues were 
discussed and ruled upon in the district court's well reasoned opinion and, therefore, only a 
"summary review of the [vagueness] issue is necessary" @. 
In only one paragaph the court addresses the vagueness issue; but it ca~ulot be ignored 
that the court juxtoposes its discussion of the language of "intent to conceal the child £ram public 
view" as relating to a11 sections of the enticement statute to foo.tnote 1, which cites I.C.$18-1509 
in its entirety. Either the court in lmew what it was doing or l.C.Sl8-1509 warrants 
further clarification by this court since the court in fou~ld tile lansuage in the statute to be 
ambiguous 
I11 support of .4ppellant's position lle relies upon State \.. Paciorek. 137 ldal~o 629: 51 P. 
5d 44; (Ct.App.3002. review denied). In Pacioielc. tile clefendant argued that liis inotioil to 
tiismiss the charge sl~ouid have been granted because i.C.$: 8-41 05 provid-d in p-rtiilent part: 
(b) An actual or simulated sex ac't, or sexual contact between 
humans and animals, or masturbation, or any graphic or pictorial 
display thereof; 
. . . is guilty of a misdemeanor 
Paclorek 137 Idaho 632 
Paciorek's position was that the adjective "simulated" in subsection (b) modified only 
"sex acts" but not "masturbation" or the other acts described in that subsection. "In other words, 
he contends that the statute criminalizes the public display of actual or simulated sex acts, but 
only actual sexual contact between humans and animals and actual masturbation. He bases this 
argument on the grammatical implications of the piacemenl of the commas and disjunctive 'or' 
after the term 'sex' act. To support his position, he relies upon the rules of grammar and 
sentence construction set out in handbooics and writing style and English grammar". Id 
The court in Paciorek relied upon the following case law in its statutory analysis of I.C.5 
The presentation of this issue places upon us the task of 
interpreting the statute so as to give effect to the underlying 
legislative intent. State. v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 
685, 688 (1999); State v. Ih~ott, 132 Idaho 476, 478, 974 P.2d 
1105, 1107 (1999). In this task, we are "uided by general 
principles of statutory construction and a comion sense appraisal 
of what the legislature intended." Lawless v. Davis- 98 idallo 175, 
176, 560 P.2d 497, 498 (1977). In interpreting a statute, we are to 
seek a sensible consrruction tliat wili avoid an absurd result. 
Gavica T'. Hanson, 101 Ida110 48, 60; 609 P.2d 861; 863 (1980) 
(o~~erruled on other grounds by Sterling \.. Bloom, 1 1  1 Ida110 21 1; 
773 P.2d 755 (1986)): State T:. Thomuson. 130 ldal~o 819, 822 n. 4; 
948 P.3d 174: J 77 n. $ (Ct. .4pp. 1.997). 70 determine iegislative 
int.~n;. we examine not only the literal words of the statute. bui also 
, - 
the context of tl~osr words. tlie public policy beliind the starute. 
and any pertinent iesislati\ae histoi-1.. Messence~ v .  Bums. 86 
Idailo 26. 29-30. 382 P . 3  913. 01 i ( 1  063): State 1.. Beard. 135 
idai~ci 64.1. 046. 22 ?.;a 1 16. i3! (Ct. .ii;,p.?OOl ) .  V\?hen ai? 
ambi~uoui stsmie is pan of a larger staruicr~ schenlc. M': l>Oi  0111>. 

The court m Paclorek, in its further analysls went on to compare I.C.§18-4105 to other 
similar statutes. S~nlilarly I.C.$lS-1509 remarkably conlpares in ail elements to the definition of 
kidnaping. I.C.$lS-4501 states: 
Every person who wilfully: 
. . . .  
2. Leads, takes, entices away or detains a child under the age of 
sixteen (16) years, with intent to  keen or conceal it from its 
custodial parent, guardian, or other person having lawful care or 
control thereoc or with intent to steal any article upon the person 
of the child; or, 
, . . . 
4. Seizes, confines, inveigles, leads, takes, entices away or kidnaps 
another against his will to extort money, property, or any other 
thlng of value or obtain money, property or reward or anj7 other 
thing of value for the return or disposition of such person is milty 
of kidnaping. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Out of the four sections of I.C.$lS-4501 ollly subsection four states an individual is guilty 
of kidnaping. Cleaxly, the legislature did not mean to state that a person who violates 
subsections one through three is not guilt); of kidnaping. By comparison and contrast I.C.Sl8- 
1509 also requires the intent to conceal a child from public view to all three subsections of the 
statute. To analqze either of these statutes otherwise, leads to an absurd result 
I.C. (jig-I509 IS VOID FOR F'AGUENESS 
At page 8 of respondent's brief: the State contends, "[a]lthouh Hamson cites to Sindak 
and its holding in a different part of his brief. he does not cite to it in his argument that the statute 
is \:ague . . . . Because Harrison is not as1:ing tiis courr to o\rerrule m: it is controlling ill tixis 
.. 
case. 011 tile co~lrrar~-. ifthir coun finds tile analysis in Hal~ison's first ar.gumeni, is based upoi? 
~iiciii r! Siixdali. lie al.gues ill tile alte~xari\;? tila: I . C $  ; S-  i 509 is void for \.agueness 
The State properly argues that the court should examine the complainant's conduct before 
analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law. State v. Larimore, 145 Idaho 428, 43 1, 179 
P3d 1084, 1087, citing, Irillaee of Hoffinan Estates v. Fhoside, 455 U.S. 489 497, 1002 S.Ct. 
1186, 1193, 71 L.Ed. 2d 362,371 (1982). Analyzing Harrison's conduct cannot be performed in 
a vacuum. Harrison never touched Sergio, never loclced the doors, never threatened him, and 
never bloclced his egress from the tn~ck. The boy even said he walked back to the tmck to ask 
Harrison his name, indicating a complete lack of fear on the boy's part. Harrison's purported 
act~ons must be evaluated along with his intent, otherwise he is not put on notice that his actions 
of offering a ride to the boy are, in and of themselves, unlawful. And, as Judge Elgee 
determined, with respect to FIarrison's intent: 
So what Mr. Harrison's intent was is open to wide 
speculation, and that's the only reference that I made. I never 
speculated on what Mr. Harrison's intent was, but what I did do 
was prohibit the jury from speculating on what his intent was in 
order to find h m  guilty. The State has to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that's an element of the offense, it's a critical 
elelllent of the offense in this case, that his intent was to kidnap or 
keep or conceal the child from the custodial parents, and I could 
not find that element or sufficient proof of that element in the 
evidence. 
So; as far as the evidence showed, the jury was left to 
speculate oil wlietller Mr. Harrison was a lonely man wanting 
somebody to tall; to or whether he had perverse purposes. As Mr. 
Cassidy plrases it: is tile Court going to indulge in the 
presunlptio~l of a sinister puvose or was Mr. Harrison going to 
net Nu-. - 01. set the cllild behind closed doors never to be seen 
- 
again? No one lnou,s. and the evidence doesn't tell us. 
Ye:;r. ill assessing the facial vaguel~ess of I.C.$18-1509. it is impe~~nissibl: va_rue ill all 
- 
of it.: a,j,131ica~iolls. Slate 1.. Cohh 133 Idaho J 95. 969 P.?d 244 ( 1 9 0 E i  citing Fioffinai? ts:aies. 
, - -  -. .- 4,- c .5 .  IO~.  ~ b e  sra:ure :a?!:: tc ~] .~\ , id : . .  ~~<,tice i:g those \v!.?c are sli?jzc to i! and cioei. n3- 
provide sufficient guidelines to those who enforce it. Q& 132 Idaho 198, citing State v. Bitt, 
1 18 Idaho 584, 588,798 P.2d 43,47 (1990). 
The scenarios provided in appellant's opening brief are not just "examples" of ways the 
sta!xte is vague. They are irrefutable proofs that I.C.$lS-1509 is vague in all of its applications 
unless there is the requisite element of Intent to conceal the child from public view. Further 
buttressing Harrison's proofs, the only scenario that is held to put individual on notice that they 
are in violation of the law is I.C.818-1509 subsection (c) which specifically states that the 
individual must have the intent to conceal the child from public view In all o the~ scenarios, or 
"proofs", the statute is indeed void for vagueness 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE the Appellant respectfully prays that the conviction be vacated and the 
case be remanded to the d~strict court herewith. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED February, 2009. 
THE ROARK LAW FIRM, LLP 
Attorney for Defendantlkp ellant 
/ P 
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